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Abstract
The European projet Secoqc (SecureCommunication based onQuan-
tum Cryptography) [1] aims at developing a global network for un-
conditionally secure key distribution. This paper specifies the require-
ments and presents the principles guiding the design of this network,
and relevant to its architecture and protocols.
1 Introduction
The performance of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) systems have no-
tably progressed since the early experimental demonstrations. The current
evolutions in QKD research [2, 3, 4, 5, 6] indicate that the pace of this pro-
gression is very likely to be maintained, if not increased, in the future years.
In parallel to these improvements of QKD techniques, commercial products
are also being developed [7], making QKD deployment a feasible alterna-
tive for securing real data networks.
Deployment of a real QKD network is however far from being straight-
forward. It requires development of a network architecture connecting
multiple users that may possibly be very far away from each other. Con-
sidering the fact that the existing QKD links are only point-to-point, and
intrinsically limited in distance, deployment of a practical QKD network
structure is a nontrivial problem, which is the target of European FP6 inte-
grated project Secoqc [1]. As a part of the Secoqc project, in this paper, we
describe the proposed architecture for a QKD network. We also specify the
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requirements relevant to the network design, protocols, and services. The
objective of this specification is to define the major components and their
main features.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2 , we start by
a brief account on the interest and applicability of quantum key distribu-
tion to secure communications. In section 3, we expose the motivations for
the development of QKD networks and provide a survey of the previous
works on QKD networks. Some major design decisions of the Secoqc QKD
network are discussed in this context as well. In Section 4, we specify the
architectural view of the Secoqc QKD network, including the components
and their connections that are essential for the design of network structure
and protocols. Finally, in Section 5, we specify the services types provided
by the QKD network and discuss the important requirements related to
these services.
2 Application of QKD to Secure Communications
Distributing keys among a set of legitimate users while guaranteeing the
secrecy of these keys with respect to any potential opponent is a central
issue in cryptography, known as the “key distribution problem”. There
are essentially two methods currently in use to solve the key distribution
problem over deployed secure communication systems: 1) public key cryp-
tography and 2) secret couriers.
Public-key cryptography foundations rest on the difficulty of solving
somemathematical problems forwhich no polynomial algorithms are known.
The computing resources needed to solve these problems become totally
unreachable when long enough keys are used. Public-key cryptographic
systems thus rely on what is called computational security. Public-key
cryptography is however not unconditionally secure; the problems onwhich
it is based are not intractable; and in addition, their non-polynomial com-
plexity has so far not been proven.
The secret courier method is known since the ancient times: a trusted
courier travels between the different legitimate users to distribute the secret
keys, hopefully without being intercepted or corrupted on his way by any
potential opponent. Only practical security can be invoked in this case,
which has to be backed by the enforcement of an appropriate set of se-
curity measures. Although secret couriers become costly and unpractical
when implemented on large systems, this technique has remained in use in
some highly-sensitive environments for which public-key cryptography is
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thought to be inappropriate, such as government intelligence or defense.
Quantum Key Distribution, invented in 1984 by Charles Bennett and Gilles
Brassard [8] based on some earlier ideas of Stephen Wiesner [9], is an al-
ternative solution for solving the key distribution problem. In contrast
to public-key cryptography it has been proven to be unconditionally se-
cure, i.e., secure against any attack, whatever time, computing power or
any other resources that may be used [10, 11]. QKD security relies on the
laws of quantum mechanics, and more specifically on the fact that it is im-
possible to gain information about non-orthogonal quantum states without
perturbing these states [12]. This property can be used to establish a ran-
dom key between two users, commonly called Alice and Bob, and guaran-
tee that the key is perfectly secret to any third party eavesdropping on the
line, commonly called Eve.
QKD Device QKD Device
Quantum Channel
Classical Channel
Alice Bob
Eve
QKD Link
Figure 1: Structure of a QKD link as it is referred throughout this article
Without going in the details of the different implementations or pro-
tocols, we can describe the structure and the principle of operation of the
basic practical QKD system: a QKD link. As depicted on Fig. 1, a QKD link
is a point-to-point connection between two users, commonly called Alice
and Bob, that want to share secret keys. The QKD link is constituted by
the combination of a quantum channel and a classical channel. Alice gen-
erates a random stream of classical bits and encodes them into a sequence
of non-orthogonal quantum states of light, sent over the quantum channel.
Upon reception of those quantum states, Bob performs some appropriate
measurements leading him to share some classical data correlated with Al-
ice’s bit stream. The classical channel is then used to test these correlations.
If the correlations are high enough, this statistically implies that no signifi-
cant eavesdropping has taken place on the quantum channel and thus that
a perfectly secure symmetric key can be distilled from the correlated data
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shared by Alice and Bob. In the opposite case, the key generation process
has to be aborted and started again.
3 QKD networks
There are several fundamental limits regarding what can be achieved with
standalone QKD links. QKD links can by definition only operate over
point-to-point connections between two users, which greatly restricts the
domain of applicability of quantum key distribution within secure com-
munication networks. Furthermore, since all QKD links rely on the trans-
mission of quantum information in order to guarantee security against on-
line eavesdropping, they will always remain intrinsically limited in rate
and distance, and cannot be deployed over any arbitrary network topol-
ogy. To overcome those limitations, it seems important to study what can
be achieved by networking QKD links in order to extend the extremely
high security standard offered by QKD to the context of long distance com-
munications between multiple users. The development of QKD network
architectures appears from this perspective as a necessary step towards the
effective integration of QKD into secure data networks.
What we will call a QKD network throughout this paper is an infras-
tructure composed of QKD links connecting multiple distant nodes. The
essential functionality of the QKD network is to distribute unconditionally
secure symmetric secret keys to any pair of legitimate users accessing the
network. These first elements of definition are however fairly generic and
can be refined. Indeed, even though we are at the infancy of the develop-
ment of QKD networks, different models of QKD networks have already
been proposed. The first QKD network demonstrator, the “DARPA Quan-
tum network”, has been deployed between Harvard University, Boston
University and BBN in 2004 [14, 15].
It is convenient to characterize the different QKD network models by
the functionality that is implemented within the nodes. We can, in this
perspective, differentiate three main categories of network concepts, based
on different “families” of node functionalities : 1) optical ; 2) quantum ; and
3) trusted relay.
“Optical QKD nodes” stands for nodes where some classical optical
function, like beam splitting, switching, multiplexing, demultiplexing, and
etc., is implemented on the quantum signals sent over the quantum chan-
nel. The interest of such optical networking functionalities is that they al-
low to go beyond 2-users QKD. One-to-many connectivity between QKD
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devices was demonstrated over a passively switched optical networks, us-
ing the random splitting of single photons upon beam splitters [16]. Active
optical switching can also be used to allow the selective connection of any
two QKD nodes with a direct quantum channel. The BBN Darpa quantum
network [14, 15] contains an active 2-by-2 optical switch in one node, that
can be used to actively switch between two network topologies. Optical
functions can thus be used to realize multi-user QKD and the correspond-
ing nodes do not need to be trusted, since quantum signals are transmitted
over an quantum channel with no interruption from one end user QKD de-
vice to the other one. Such QKD network model can however not be used
to extend the distance over which keys can be distributed. Indeed, the extra
amount of optical losses introduced in the nodes will in reality shorten the
maximum span of quantum channels.
To be able to extend the distance on which key distribution can be per-
formed, it is necessary to fight against the degradation of quantum signal
along its propagation on the quantum channel. This process, known as de-
coherence [17], is typically quantum and can only be taken care of by the
use of nodes which are able to perform some active transformations on the
quantum signals sent over the quantum channel. We will call such nodes
quantum nodes. Quantum nodes can be of different flavors, but all rely
on entanglement, that can be used as a resource for secure key generation
[21]. Indeed, as explained in [18], a network of distant quantum memories
each of them able to store a share of a multipartite entangled states can be
used for quantum cryptographic purposes. In this perspective, the main
challenge of quantum nodes is to distribute entangled states over long dis-
tances. The most elaborated quantum nodes proposed so far are quantum
repeaters [19]. They use entangled photon sources, quantummemories and
purification of entanglement to obtain perfect entangled states, stored in
nodes, over a quantum channel segment. Such segments are then chained
and entanglement swapping used to obtain end-to-end perfect entangle-
ment over an arbitrary long distance. Quantum repeaters however rely on
elaborated quantum operations and on quantum memories that cannot be
realized with current technologies. As discussed in [20], quantum nodes
called quantum relays could also be used to extend the reach of QKD.
Quantum relays are simpler to implement that quantum repeaters since
the do they don’t require quantum memories. Building quantum relays
remains however technologically difficult and would not allow to extend
QKD reach to arbitrary long distances.
Classical trusted relays can on the other hand be implemented with to-
day’s technologies since such nodes consist in classical memories, that we
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will call key stores, placed in secure locations. QKD networks based on
trusted key relays follow a simple principle: local keys are generated over
QKD links and then stored in nodes that are placed on both ends of each
link. Global key distribution is performed over a QKD path, i.e. a one-
dimensional chain of trusted relays connected by QKD links, establishing a
connection between two end nodes, as shown on Fig. 2. Secret keys are for-
warded, in a hop-by-hop fashion, alongQKD paths. To ensure their secrecy,
one-time-pad encryption and unconditionally secure authentication, both
realized with a local QKD key, are performed. End-to-end information-
theoretic security is thus obtained between the end nodes, provided that
the intermediate nodes can be trusted. Classical trusted relays can be used
to build a long-distance QKD network. They have been used in the BBN
QKD network [14, 15] and will also be used to build the Secoqc QKD net-
work [1].
Node1 Node2 Node3 Node4 Node5
Figure 2: “Hop-by-hop” unconditionally secure message passing on a path
made of trusted relay nodes connected by QKD links. Message decryption
/ re-encryption is done at each intermediate node, by using one-time-pad
between the local key, distributed by QKD, Klocal, and the secret message
M resulting in the ciphered messageM
⊕
Klocal. Different key association
are symbolized by different colors.
The focus of the Secoqc project is on “long-range high security com-
munications” based on quantum key distribution”. As explained above,
this imposes to rely on trusted nodes used as key relays. We have adopted
this network model within the Secoqc project. An important choice is how-
ever the way the local keys are used to secure long-distance traffic. The
main originality of the Secoqc project with respect to previous works on
QKD networks relies in the fact that we have opted for a dedicated key dis-
tribution network infrastructure that we have called “network of secrets”
[25, 23, 22]. The functionality of the network of secrets is solely to store,
forward, and manage the secret key materials generated by QKD. Such key
distribution network is characterized by dedicated link, network and trans-
port layers and can be considered somehow independently of the quantum
key generation processes and on the key requests arising from application.
The central design issue behind this concept is that the keys are stored
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and managed within key stores, placed in nodes, and not within QKD de-
vices or within the machines running endpoint secure applications. This
design choice allows to manage keys over a dedicated global network (the
network of secrets) composed of key stores linked together with classical
channels. The network of secrets is by essence a classical network but we
will call it the “Secoqc QKD network” or “the QKD network” in the rest of
this paper since we will always assume that the underlying key generation
mechanism, responsible for filling the key stores, is quantum key distribu-
tion. We present the architecture of this QKD network in the next section.
4 Architecture of the Secoqc QKD Network
In this section, we explain the proposed architecture of the Secoqc QKD
network and its components. The purpose is to provide an abstract per-
spective which gives a clear picture of the components and the environ-
ment for designing the details of network protocols. We also discuss the
expected functional and nonfunctional requirements of the QKD network.
4.1 QKD Network Structure
Many interesting network functionalities arise from the fact that the net-
work graph of QKD links and QKD nodes may provide redundant paths
between any two nodes. Within Secoqc, we have decided to focus on such
topologies for our QKD network. Such redundant topologies are typically
found in the core of communication networks. This is the reason why
we are referring to Quantum Backbone (QBB) nodes for the central and
multiply-connected nodes within our QKD network.
The architecture of the Secoqc QKD network is illustrated in Fig. 3: the
QKD network is composed of a set of Quantum BackBone (QBB) nodes
that are connected by QBB links in order to distribute unconditionally se-
cure keys between any pair of application programs that are running on
host computers. The whole structure constitutes a global key forwarding
backbone network. In this network, the host computers are connected to
different QBB nodes across the network. Alternatively, an application pro-
gram can run on a host computer which is connected to a Quantum Ac-
cess Node (QAN). QAN is a node with limited capabilities; it implements
very little routing functionalities, but is more specialized in providing ac-
cess interface to many client applications. As shown in Fig. 3, the QAN
is connected to a QBB node via a secure connection, e.g., a QKD link. The
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application programs that intend to have secure communications over a
public network, such as the Internet, can use the QKD network for gener-
ation of unconditionally secure session keys. These session keys, can then
be used for cryptographic purposes. It has to be emphasized that the QKD
network will not carry the real data traffic among application programs.
The sole responsibility of the QKD network is to share secret keys with un-
conditional security. The actual communications, as shown in Fig. 3, are
performed on the existing public or private networks.
Upon the request of an application program, namely the master appli-
cation program, the ingress QBB or QAN node, which is the access point
for the master application program, examines the possibility of providing
a path for the requested destination with the desired Quality of Service
(QoS). The destination application program, namely the slave application
program, obviously, must be connected to another QBB or QAN node,
which is referred to by the egress QBB or QAN node. If the QKD net-
work has enough resources, it will accept the request for path establish-
ment. Otherwise, the request will be rejected. If the path is established suc-
cessfully, upon the request of the master application program, the ingress
QBB or QAN node generates a random session key and forwards it through
the QKD network to the egress QBB/QANnode, which will deliver the key
to the slave application program. In its way through the QKD network the
session keys will be secured through hop-by-hop one-time-padding using
the local keys. Local keys, that are information theoretically secure, are es-
tablished via QBB links between adjacent QBB nodes. As shown in Fig. 3,
QBB nodes are located inside private and secure networks (sites). Regard-
ing that the local keys are unconditionally secure and that the QBB nodes
are inside secure locations, we can conclude that the QKD network can be
used for global distribution of unconditionally secure session keys. Note
that the QBB links, which connect adjacent QBB nodes, are deployed over
potentially unsecured locations; thus, they are vulnerable to different types
of security threats. However, hop-by-hop one-time-padding assures secu-
rity of session keys. Furthermore, redundant paths over the QKD network
can be utilized by the routing and forwarding protocols to combat Denial
of Service (DoS) attacks.
From the network point of view, QBB nodes are analogous to the routers
in the traditional inter-networking infrastructures. Wewill discuss themain
components of the network, i.e., the QBB links and the QBB nodes, with
further details in the subsequent sections of this paper.
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Figure 3: The structure of the Secoqc QKD network
4.2 QBB Links
The QBB links are special links, connecting QBB nodes together. As shown
in Fig. 4, each QBB link consists of:
1. arbitrary number of quantum channels to send quantum bits;
2. a classical channel for signaling and forwarding of session keys.
Quantum channels are used to send quantum bits, and the classical
channel is used for signalling and session key forwarding. There might
be several quantum channels between two adjacent QBB nodes to improve
the effective key generation rate. However, since an extra pair of quantum
devices is required to establish a single quantum channel, the economical
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Figure 4: QBB link
factors might hinder establishment of multiple quantum channels. Refer-
ring to the classical notion of QKD link in Section 2, a QBB link is an exten-
sion of a QKD link, which allows to improve effective key generation rate.
The importance of this parallel structure can be revealed if we consider the
typical dependency between the length of a QKD link and the effective key
generation rate as shown in Fig. 5. The vertical axis shows the effective key
R (log scale)
R0
Dmax
Distance
λQKD
Figure 5: Typical profile of the Rate versus Distance curve for a single QKD
link.
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generation rate, and the the horizontal axis shows the distance between the
QKD devices. Three essential parameters can be used to characterize the
shape of this curve:
1. The secret bit rate at zero distance, R0. It is typically in the range 100
kbit/s to a few Mbit/s for current technologies.
2. The scaling parameter λQKD. As long as the signal to noise ration
is high enough and therefore the error rate well below some security
threshold, the logarithm of the secret bit rate scales linearly with dis-
tance: R(l) = R0 e
−l/λQKD . The scaling parameter is platform and
protocol dependent, but typically varies between 5 and 25 km for
QBB candidates platforms [24]
3. The maximum distanceDmax. This distance is also platform and pro-
tocol dependent and can vary from 20-30 km for short distance sys-
tems to 100-120 km for long-distance systems.
Stand-alone quantum channels are not sufficient to establish uncondi-
tionally secure local keys. Further signalling through a complementary
classical channel is required to extract unconditionally secure keys from the
raw key materials, derived from the measurements of quantum bits. In the
Secoqc QKD network, the session keys are forwarded by the QBB nodes in
their path to the destination over the classical channels. The classical chan-
nel is also used for other purposes, e.g., routing messages, network man-
agement messages, and etc. The classical channel is a virtual channel rather
than a physical channel. That is, it could be either established over a pub-
lic network through a TCP/IP socket or it could be a direct point-to-point
link between two adjacent QBB nodes. The classical channels in the QKD
network are not secure channels. Proper cryptographic algorithms must
be used if the communication has to be secured using the local keys which
are generated by the QKD devices. For example, if some routing messages
have to be authenticated, a proper scheme must be implemented.
It is important to note that quantum channels are subject to a variety of
security threats by adversaries. However, the responsibility of QKD pro-
tocols [8] is to generate local keys between QBB nodes while being able to
detect eavesdropping. Two QKD devices will succeed to extract a secure
key from the raw key materials obtained from measurements of quantum
bits provided that the quantum bit error rate is below some security thresh-
old [13]. If the raw key bits contain toomany errors, securitywith respect to
eavesdropping cannot be guaranteed, thus, the raw key bits are discarded.
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Obviously, an adversary can interrupt the key stream between two nodes
by measuring the quantum signals, introducing too many errors. One ob-
jective of the QKD network is thus to enhance resiliency of key distribution
by providing redundant paths among QBB nodes. This implies that the
network protocols should be able to detect possible attacks on the individ-
ual links and react to them by choosing proper forwarding paths between
QBB nodes.
4.3 QBB Node
QBB nodes are the main elements of the QKD network. Similar to routers
in a conventional network, they forward session keys across the QBB net-
work. They can also serve as access points for key clients (i.e., applica-
tion programs). Physically, QBB nodes are special computers with multi-
ple QBB interface ports, enabling connection to multiple QBB links. Each
QBB node can also have multiple QKD devices to create parallel QKD links
on each individual QBB link. The QKD devices can operate over different
types of quantum channels and rely on different technologies, provided
that they comply with the QBB node’s standard interface. There is also an
interface for classical channel on each QBB port. The logical structure of the
software components of a QBB node is shown in Fig. 6. The major software
components are: 1) Multiple instances of Quantum Point-to-Point Protocol
(Q3P) [25] modules which serve as the link layer modules for the QBB links;
2) a routing module which is responsible for collecting and maintaining
the local routing information; and 3) a forwarding module for maintain-
ing paths and making forwarding decisions. All other software modules
such as node management, local connection management, random session
key generator, security monitor and etc. reside inside the box denoted by
"other modules". We do not elaborate on the other modules in this paper as
they have no or little interaction with networking responsibilities of a QBB
node.
Q3P module manages all link level communication issues between two
adjacent QBB node. A Q3P module includes a submodule for managing
the communications over a classical channel, including functionalities for
1) authentication; 2) encryption/decryption; 3) fragmentation/assembling;
4) flow control; 5) link level error control; 6) congestion control, if the clas-
sical channel is established through a public network; 6) connection man-
agement between two adjacent QBB nodes. Q3P module also includes a
submodule which acts as an array of device drivers for the QKD device
array. This module collects local keys from the QKD devices and deliv-
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Figure 6: QBB node
ers them to a key store. Note that the QKD devices constantly generate
local keys at their maximum key generation capacities. The QKD device
drivers also allow the QKD devices to share a single classical channel as
it is needed for key generation process inside the QKD devices. Another
important submodule of a Q3P module is the key store. The main purpose
of the key store is to compensate low key generation rate of QKD devices
by accumulating a big database of ready to use local keys which will be
used for local cryptographic operations between two adjacent QBB nodes
that are connected by a QBB link. Having the key stores, QBB nodes can
tolerate secret key traffic bursts by buffering keys which are generated at a
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constant rate, but will be consumed with a random rate.
To function as a router, the QBB node incorporates modules for key
forwarding and routing. The key forwarding module examines the desti-
nation address or the virtual circuit number of the incoming network key
packets, performs necessary processing, and forwards them to the appro-
priate output buffer corresponding to a particular Q3P instance. An ex-
ample of forwarding path inside a QBB node is illustrated by the dashed
curve in Fig. 6. A scheduling scheme prioritizes departure of packets from
the buffer to the destination Q3P instance according to the QoS require-
ments of the buffered key packets. Forwarding module also manages vir-
tual circuits if necessary. This includes call admission control, and traffic
policing. Forwarding module also creates and terminates virtual circuits
inside a QBB node. In order to enable key packet forwarding, a QBB node
includes a module for calculation and maintenance of routing information,
e.g., routing tables.
5 Requirements of Services Provided by the Key Dis-
tribution Network Layer
In this section, we classify and specify the types of services that will be pro-
vided by the Secoqc QKD network. This will help selecting proper rout-
ing and forwarding scheme for the QKD network. Simply put, the QKD
network should provide unconditionally secure and synchronized keys for
the consuming application peers. A typical scenario can be explained by
regarding the specified architecture in Section 4: an application program,
running on a host computer which is connected to a QBB or QAN node,
intends to open a secure connection to another application, running on an-
other host which is also connected to another QBB or QAN node. An exam-
ple could be an email client which is to setup an SSL connection to a mail
server. Another example is when a security gateway attempts to establish
a VPN connection through IPSec to another security gateway. Currently,
these applications rely on a preset shared secret or certified public keys to
generate session keys. However, they can be modified to send their request
to a QBB/QAN node to establish a path through the QKD network to the
other end point. The key request should contain information about:
1. the address of the destination node;
2. the port number of the destination application;
14
3. the QoS parameters such as key refreshment rate;
4. the key block length.
The ingress QBB node, which has received the request, tries to establish
such a connection throughQKD network by examining the local routing in-
formation and negotiation with the other QBB nodes that might participate
in establishing the connection. If the path establishment is accomplished
successfully, the ingress QBB node replies to the request of the initiating
application with a positive message. In this case, the egress QBB node in-
forms the other party by sending an appropriate message. Otherwise, if the
path establishment fails due to insufficient available resources or other rea-
sons, appropriate acknowledgment is sent out to the initiating application
program. The failure acknowledgment message could offer the initiating
application with the best available QoS. After path establishment process,
the QKD network should maintain the connection, and forward secret key
which will be generated by the ingress QBB node to the Egress QBB node
reliably.
Regarding the aforementioned overview of the services of the QKD net-
work, some of the functional requirements of the QKD network are:
1. creation and maintenance of proper routing information which will
be distributed among QBB nodes;
2. establishment and maintenance of paths between Ingress and Egress
QBB nodes;
3. forwarding of secret keys by OTP through specified paths;
4. coping with possible network and link level errors;
5. monitoring security of the established path.
In terms of QoS, the initial implementation of the QKD network will
provide the following service types.
1. Best effort: for this type of service, a consuming application will be
allowed to transmit session keys with an average rate, λk, and burst
of σk. For this type of service, the QKD network do not provide any
guarantee of QoS; the (λk, σk) pair only specifies the upper bounds on
the request of the customer. In other words, a customer with this type
of service may receive less than what specified by the upper bound.
However, note that, regardless of the type of service, the QKD net-
work provides a reliable session key transport.
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2. Guaranteed key rate: for this type of service, the QKD network guar-
antees a certain rate of session keys. More specifically, the customer
is allowed to ask for certain amount of keys within a certain period
of time. For instance, a customer may sign a contract for 128 kbits of
key materials every one second. Note that in this context, the QKD
network can only give a statistical guarantee of service.
An important nonfunctional requirement of QKD network is load bal-
ancing by choosing proper paths which might not be the shortest paths.
This is important as the QBB links have limited capacities. This also im-
plies that the algorithms and schemes that heavily rely on encrypted or au-
thenticated signalling messages will not be reasonable choices for the QKD
network. Let’s finally mention that QKD network routing and forwarding
algorithms also should be resilient against link failure since such failures
may be directly due to the detection of security threats by some security
monitoring agents.
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